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NOTES AND COMMENT
porations shall have the right to sue and shall be subject to be
sued in all courts in like cases as natural persons. . . ." (Em-
phasis supplied.) The word "corporation" is not qualified.
Couple all this with the fact that local self government ex-
isted in England and the Colonies before there ever was a state
constitution, and with the fact that municipal corporations were
and are regularly subjected to the burdens and liabilities of pri-
vate persons engaged in similar proprietary affairs, and it is
fairly inferable from the language used that the framers in-
tended to protect municipal corporations in those affairs as
private corporations.
In summary, local self government in municipal corpora-
tions is socially and economically desirable and is a character-
istic mark of English and American democracy. Some states
have expressly provided for a right to local self government by
amendment to their constitutions, but on sound legal principles
there is no room for a theory of a reserved right existing inde-
pendently of such express constitutional provision. However,
another theory of local self government has been adopted by a
few jurisdictions which, though more limited, is sound on legal
principles. It is that municipalities, when acting in proprietary
or private matters, are protected as private corporations by the
due process clauses of the state constitutions. Montana has not
only given verbal approval to this theory but has actually de-
cided cases on the basis of it. There can be no doubt now but
that the Montana Supreme Court will hold invalid any legisla-
tive interference in municipal affairs which would be a violation
of due process if municipalities were ordinary private corpora-
tions acting in a similar activity.
It is submitted that the position of the Montana Supreme
Court is socially, economically, and legally sound.
ROBERT L. EHLERS.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Substantive Law
Res ipsa loquitur, literally translated, means "the thing
speaks for itself." The courts in deciding cases often quote and
refer to this literal translation.' Shortly, attorneys refer to it
'Johnson v. Herring, 89 Mont. 420, 300 P. 535 (1931) ; Maki v. Murray
Hospital, 91 Mont. 521, 7 P. (2d) 228 (1932) ; Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. Midgett, 116 F. (2d) 562 (1941) ; Cunningham v. Dady, 191
N.Y. 152, 83 N.E. 689 (1908) ; Morner v. Union Pac. R. Co., 196 P. (2d)
744 (1948).
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as the res ipsa doctrine; more important as one authority puts
it is, what does it say I Probably the best statement as to its ap-
plication is to be found in the case of San Juan Light and Transit
Company v. Belen Requena, where the Supreme Court of the
United States said:
". .. when a thing which causes injury, without
fault of the injured person, is shown to be under the
exclusive control of the defendant, and the injury is such
as, in the ordinary course of things, does not occur if
the one having such control uses proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that
the injury arose from the defendant's want of care. ""
Montana in the early and often quoted decision of Hardesty
v. Largey Lumber Co.' gives a somewhat similar definition:
".. . where the thing which causes the injury is
shown to be under the management and control of the
defendant and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have such
management and control use proper care, it affords rea-
sonable evidence in the absence of explanation by de-
fendant, that the accident arose from want of ordinary
care by defendant."
Comparing these statements, we note one difference. The
United States Supreme Court requires three things before the
doctrine is applicable: (1) an injury which does not ordinarily
occur in the absence of negligence, (2) exclusive control by the
defendant, and (3) that the injured person be without fault.
Montana includes the first two requirements above, but leaves
out the third. However, the recognition by the court of the fault
of a fellow servant as precluding application of the doctrine in
McGowan v. Nelson,' might well be persuasive that similarly the
Montana court would in a proper case find probable fault of the
injured person to be an obstacle to its application.
There is, in addition to these three requirements, a fourth
held necessary by a few courts, but expressly denied by others.
This is the requirement that evidence as to the explanation of the
2224 U. S. 89, 56 L. Ed. 680, 32 S. Ct. 399 (1912).8Affirmed in Jesionowski v. Boston and Maine Rr., 329 U.S. 452, 91
L. Ed. 416, 67 S. Ct. 401, 169 A.L.R. 947 (1947).
Some other cases giving same definition: Morner v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 196 P. (2d) 744 (1948) ; Rojas v. Pennsylvania Tunnel and Termi-
nal R. Co., 47 N.Y.S. (2d) 82 (1944) ; Williamson v. Pacific Greyhound
Lines, 70 Cal. App. (2d) 482, 177 P. (2d) 977 (1947).
'34 Mont. 151, 86 P. 29 (1906).
'36 Mont. 67, 92 P. 40 (1907).
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accident must be more readily available to the defendant than
to the plaintiff. This requirement often is stated by words re-
quiring the defendant to have a better knowledge of the cause
of the injury than the plaintiff.' However, most courts reject
this requirement. In a case where defendant was killed in an
accident, one court holds that the fact that the cause was not
known to defendant makes no difference, as the whole theory of
res ipsa loquitur is that "the thing speaks for itself."' Montana
has, however, given a slight indication that this requirement is
necessary. In one case,8 it was said that the theory of res ipsa
loquitur is that the plaintiff does not know the cause, whereas
the defendant does, and should, therefore, be required to produce
evidence. This was mentioned in connection with a procedural
ruling and therefor may not be as important a precedent as if
the issue had concerned substantive law.
Some explanation is necessary as to the interpretation the
courts have given the three main requirements. As to the first,
an injury which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negli-
gence: the courts hold that the mere fact that the plaintiff was
injured is not enough,' but the facts and attendant circumstances
invoking the existence of the doctrine must be present.' In-
herent in this is the requirement that the injury itself be one
that gives rise to an inference of negligence.
The second requirement, exclusive control by the defendant
is somewhat more difficult: it is held that control here means
the right of control at the time and not actual physical control.'
Thus it is usually possible to apply the rule to all kinds of agency
problems including a fellow servant injury ;I' however, Montana
seems to have rejected the fellow servant application. In Mc-
Gowan v. Nelson 0 where the plaintiff was injured by a falling
plank while working for the defendant, the court held res ipsa
did not apply as it was not known whether the plank fell from
'Hart v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 233 Mo. App. 312, 118 S.W.
(2d) 509 (1938) ; PRoss a, LAW OF ToRTs (1941) § 43, pp. 301, 302.
'Waller v. Worstall, 50 Ohio App. 11, 197 N.E. 410 (1934).
'Lyon v. Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co. of Montana, 50 Mont. 532, 148 P.
386 (1915).
'Glover v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co., 54 Mont. 446, 171
P. 278 (1918) ; Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 521, 7 P. (2d) 228
(1932) ; Charlton v. Lovelace, 351 Mo. 364. 173 S.W. (2d) 13 (1943).
"Charlton v. Lovelace, 351 Mo. 364, 173 S.W. (2d) 13 (1943).
"Hart v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 233 Mo. App. 312, 118
S.W. (2d) 509 (1938).
'Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 46, 92 L. Ed. 68, 68 S. Ct. 391, mo-
tion denied 333 U. S. 865, 92 L. Ed. 1143, 68 S. Ct. 788 (1948).
"36 Mont. 67, 92 P. 40 (1907).
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the defendant's negligent piling of planks or because of some
fellow servant's negligence. So the plaintiff must show more
than the fact that the injury occurred on the defendant's prop-
erty ; he must show that the defendant actually did have some
control. Most courts say the plaintiff must show more than a
mere possibility that the defendant had control, he must show a
probability." Sometimes too, the defendant is held liable where
the plaintiff has control at the actual time of the accident: so it
was held by one court'" where a coca-cola bottle exploded in a
waitress's hand, the court saying:
".. -the doctrine may be applied upon the theory
that defendant had control at the time of the alleged
negligent act, although not at the time of the accident,
provided plaintiff first proves that the condition of the
instrumentality had not been changed after it left the
defendant's possession."
It also points out that all that is necessary is a reasonable infer-
ence that nothing happened to the instrumentality after it left
the control of the defendant. Along these lines it has also been
held that where the thing which caused the injury was within
the exclusive control of the defendant, the possibility that some
third person, who was an inter-meddler and in no way connected
with the defendant, tampered with it so as to make it defective
or dangerous does not defeat the application of the doctrine.
The third major requirement, that the plaintiff be without
fault, means merely that there must be no contributory negli-
gence.m ' As has already been pointed out, Montana has not ex-
pressly stated this requirement in its definition.
After looking at the requirements it must also be pointed
out that there are places in which the doctrine is not applicable,
even if these requirements are all present. Thus it has been held
that the doctrine does not apply where the defendant's only duty
is to avoid affirmative or active negligence as to a trespasser or
4 Other cases also holding this: Engdal v. Owl Drug Co., 183 Wash. 100,
48 P. (2d) 232 (1935) ; Foster v. A. P. Jacobs and Associates, 85 Cal.
App. (2d) 746, 193 P. (2d) 971 (1948).
"See also: Scheytt v. Gallatin Valley Milling Co., 54 Mont. 565, 172 P.
321 (1918).
16Supra, note 11.
"7Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. (2d) 453, 150 P.
(2d) 436 (1944).
"aSupra, note 11.
"Supra, note 17.
'Brust v. C. J. Kubach Co., 130 Cal. App. 152,19 P. (2d) 845 (1933).
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a gratuitious licensee,' but it does apply to an invitee.' Also the
doctrine does not apply where the injury was beyond doubt the
voluntary or intentional act of some person.' In the past the
tendency of the courts was to refuse application of the doctrine
where complicated machinery was involved on the theory that
too many things could happen to the machinery too fast," but the
tendency today is away from this view. One court has held that
the very fact that the instrumentality doing damage is peculiar
and inherently dangerous is a common and proper consideration
for the application of the maxim.'
The doctrine arose in connection with a carrier case and is
still very often invoked in this connection. In this field the
doctrine has become what is sometimes referred to as a "monster
child." The courts here seem to impose liability much more
freely than in a case not involving the presence of a carrier."
Many courts though, as Prosser in his work on the subject
points out, refuse the application of the doctrine by a passenger
against the other driver in case of a collision on the theory that
there is no exclusive control by the defendant.'
As pointed out in one leading law encyclopedia,' the doctrine
has also been both applied and denied application to injuries
from falling objects, collapsing structures or similar occurrences,
escaping water or chemicals, defective machinery or appliances
negligently operated, defective or dangerous condition of
premises or particular parts thereof, and exploding bottles and
fires. The doctrine is usually denied in malpractice cases although
sometimes invoked where the charge is not for improper treat-
ment of the illness for which it is sought, but for an incidental
injury as where the patient received a large blister on her chest
during an operation for appendicitis.' The doctrine has also
been much invoked in electrical cases."
'Biondini v. Amship Corporation, 81 Cal. App. (2d) 751, 185 P. (2d)
94 (1947) ; Brust v. C. J. Kubach Co., 130 Cal. App. 152, 19 P. (2d)
845 (1933).
"Biondini v. Amship Corporation, 81 Cal. App. (2d) 751, 185 P. (2d)
94 (1947).
'Supra, note 10.
"Beebe v. St. Louis Transit Co., 206 Mo. 419, 103 S.W. 1019, 12 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 760 (1907).
'Gould v. Winona Gas Co., 100 Minn. 258, 111 N.W. 254, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.)
889 (1907).
"Gleason v. Virginia Midland R. Co., 140 U. S. 435, 35 L. Ed. 458, 11 S.
Ct. 859 (1891).
"PtossE, LAW OF ToRTs § 43, p. 299 (1941).
"65 C.J.S. Negligence § 220 (12).
"Vonault v. O'Rourke, 97 Mont. 92, 33 P. (2d) 535 (1934).
"Haule v. Helena Gas and Electric Co. (C.C.A. 9th, 1929), 31 F. (2d) 671.
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In seeking to apply the doctrine, the facts and circumstances
of each case should be closely inspected instead of trying to form
a rigid formula for it to work in.
Adjective Law
As has been pointed out, res ipsa loquitur, when applicable,
furnishes evidence of the negligence of the defendant. Probably
the most confused part of this doctrine is the weight to be given
to this evidence. Thus, some courts have said that this evidence
is to be treated as an inference of negligence, others that it
should be treated as a presumption of negligence, and still others
that it should be treated as prima facie negligence. In addition
to the confusion that these rulings bring, is the fact that while
one court may seem to adopt one of these methods of treatment
in so far as words are concerned, it is in reality adopting a dif-
ferent rule.' What would seem to be the better view and also
said to be the majority view" is the view taken by the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Sweeney v. Erving:"
"In our opinion, res ipsa loquitur means that the
facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negli-
gence, not that they compel such an inference; that they
furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where di-
rect evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evidence to
be weighed not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient;
that they call for an explanation or rebuttal, not neces-
sarily that they require it; that they make a case to be
decided by the jury not that they forestall the verdict."
Under this rule it seems clear that the evidence that arises from
the doctrine is merely a permissible inference that the jury can
either accept or reject whether the defendant makes a rebuttal
or not," the theory being that in the ordinary case, men differ
as to the reasonable conclusion to be drawn; that what one man
might think negligent the other might not. Contrasted to this
view, however, is the same Court's view in regards to passengers
"White v. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, 108 P. (2d) 249 (1940).
"PROSsER, LAw OF ToRTs § 44 pp. 302, 303 (1941).
"228 U. S. 233, 57 L. Ed. 815, 33 S. Ct. 416, Ann. Cas. 1914 D. 905 (1913)
Affirmed in Jesionowski v. Boston and Maine Rr., 329 U. S. 452, 91 L.
Ed. 416, 67 S. Ct. 401, 169 A.L.R. 947 (1947) ; also affirmed in Johnson
v. United States, 333 U. S. 46, 92 L. Ed. 68, 68 S. Ct. 391, motion denied
333 U. S. 865, 92 L. Ed. 1143, 68 S. Ct. 788 (1948).
"Other cases holding an inference: Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Simmons (C.C.A.N.M., 1946) 153 F. (2d) 206; Charlton v. Lovelace, 351
Mo. 364, 173 S.W. (2d) 13 (1943) ; Weller v. Worstall, 50 Ohio App. 11,
197 N.E. 410 (1934).
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in carrier cases; thus in Gleason v. Virginia Midland R. Co." it
was said:
"1... the happening of an injurious accident is in
passenger cases prima facie evidence of negligence on
the part of the carrier . .. ."(Italics the Court's).
This is explained by the general unfavorable attitude toward car-
riers that the doctrine has developed, which has been mentioned
before. This view, as regards the United States Supreme Court,
should be considered an exception to the general rule first quoted.
The second and a minority view is that res ipsa loquitur
creates a presumption or prima facie case which if not rebutted
may result in a directed verdict for the plaintiff. An illustration
of this rule is to be found in Druzanich v. Criley, where the
California court said:
"The rule is well settled by ... the appellate courts
,of this state to the effect that the inference of negligence
which is created by the rule res ipsa loquitur is in itself
evidence which may not be disregarded by the jury and
in the absence of any other evidence as to negligence,
necessitates a verdict in favor of a plaintiff. It is in-
cumbent on the defendant to rebut the prima facie case
so created . .. ."
Here it seems that the word "presumption" would have been
more accurate than "inference." Under this minority view, the
presumption created is rebuttable, and generally all that it is
necessary for the defendant to show to rebut it is an exercise
of ordinary care. The ultimate burden of proof still rests on
the plaintiff. The majority view also allows a directed verdict
at times, but only where the minds of reasonable men could not
differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.'
A third, but very much in the minority, view is that the
evidence under res ipsa loquitur raises a presumption of negli-
gence and shifts to the defendant the ultimate burden of proof,
requiring him to introduce evidence of greater weight than that
of the plaintiff.' Nothing can be said in support of this rule,
and it is very seldom used.
Now, where does Montana stand in the foregoing decisions?
Probably in the second group, that a presumption or prima facie
case in created which must be rebutted.
-140 U. S. 435, 35 L. Ed. 458, 11 S. Ct. 859 (1891).
"19 Cal. (2d) 439, 122 P. (2d) 53 (1942).
"Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. Co. v. Simmons (C.C.A.N.M., 1946) 153 F.
(2) 206.
"PROSsER, L&w Or TosTs § 44, pp. 304 (1941).
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A perusal of some of Montana's pertinent decisions in
chronological order would seem to bring out this viewpoint:
In Pierce v. Great Falls and Canada Railway Co.,' the plain-
tiff was injured by a derailment of a car while traveling on the
defendant's line. Plaintiff alleged specific acts of -negligence;
defective roadbeds, rails, ties, tracks, cars, locomotives, and fail-
ure properly to inspect. Defendant, for whom the jury found,
replied that the derailment was caused by a high wind, an act
of God. On appeal the court said that although proof of a de-
railment and injury was made which is ordinarily prima facie
evidence of negligence on the part of the carrier, the plaintiff
had alleged only specific acts of negligence and must stand on
the cause of action stated; and that even if a prima facie infer-
ence would arise from the derailment and injury it had been met,
rebutted, and overcome by the proof of the defendant.
In Hardesty v. Largey Lumber Co.' lumber was piled
negligently on the defendant's property, and the plaintiff, an
employee of the defendant, was injured when it fell on him.
After the plaintiff showed that the defendant was in charge of
the piling and had been seemingly indifferent in his orders to
workmen about the care to be taken in piling, the defendant
moved for a non-suit on the ground that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to show negligence, but was overruled. Defendant then in-
troduced evidence tending to show reasonable care on its part.
The jury, however, found for the plaintiff. On appeal the court
affirmed the decision saying:
"We think the doctrine of the maxim of 'res ipsa
loquitur' is applicable to the facts of this case, and that
the evidence offered by the plaintiff aided with the pre-
sumption which this doctrine raises makes out a prima
facie case to go to the jury . .. ."
In John v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.,' the plaintiff, a
gratuitous passenger on the defendant's railroad, was injured
when the sleeping car in which he was riding was derailed. Plain-
tiff proved the derailment and the injury, and the jury found
in his favor. The judgment was affirmed on appeal, the court
saying:
"But when the plaintiff has sustained and dis-
charged this burden of proof by showing that the in-
jury arose in consequence of the failure .. .of the car-
rier's means of transportation ... then, in conformity
822 Mont. 445, 56 P. 867 (1899).
'34 Mont. 151, 86 P. 29 (1906).
"42 Mont. 18, 111 P. 632, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 85 (1910).
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with the maxim, res ipsa loquitur, a presumption arises
of negligence on the part of the carrier or his servants
which unless rebutted by him to the satisfaction of the
jury will authorize a verdict and judgment against him
for the resulting damages." (Italics the court's).
Later in the same case it is said:
"If there is no countervailing evidence.., the plain-
tiff is plainly, by force of this presumption, entitled to
a verdict, and no sound reason is perceived why the
judge should not be allowed to so instruct the jury."
In Lyon v. Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co. of Montana," the
defendant railroad had excavated earth from the right of way to
build up grades which were constructed near a river. The ex-
cavation left a barrow pit deeper than the river channel with
only a small strip of land between the pit and the river serving
as an embankment. In high water the embankment was washed
away and debris was deposited on the plaintiff's land, the river
also cutting a new channel through the plaintiff's land. Plain-
tiff alleged specific acts of negligence on the part of the defend-
ant in the excavation. Plaintiff made out a prima facie case on
the specific allegations, the jury, however, finding for the de-
fendant. The judgment was affirmed on appeal, the court hold-
ing the plaintiff could not invoke res ipsa where she already had
made out a prima facie case under specific allegations. The court
said of res ipsa:
"The rule res ipsa loquitur invoked by appellant,
when properly applied, operates to make out a prima
facie case, but goes no further. It has the force and
effect of a disputable presumption of law and supplies
the place of proof necessarily wanting."
In Johnson v. Herring," the plaintiff's six year old son was
run over and killed by an ice truck driven by the defendant
Herring who was an employee of the Great Falls Ice and Fuel
Co., also a defendant. The facts showed a bright clear day and
the accident occurred in an alley, 20 feet wide with no obstruc-
tions to view or passage. The truck entered the alley from the
west and delivered some ice. Plaintiff's son and a friend tried
to secure some ice while the driver was absent but left and walked
east in the alley on the driver's return. The friend testified he
didn't see the truck until it was almost upon him, and had to
jump to get out of the way, and that the driver sounded no
warning. When he looked around he saw plaintiff's son lying
250 Mont. 532, 148 P. 386 (1915).
"89 Mont. 420, 300 P. 535 (1931).
9
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in the middle of the alley. The driver testified he didn't see the
boys and only stopped on hearing a "thump." He then picked
up the boy, and took him to the hospital where he died thirty
minutes later. The bruises on the body of the plaintiff's son
were suspicious, being multiple while the attending physician
testified that only one foot could have been passed over by the
truck. A motion for non-suit by defendant was granted on this
evidence and plaintiff appealed. The court reversed, holding
the evidence showed plaintiff had made out a prima facie case,
which, in the absence of any explanation would sustain a verdict
in the favor of the plaintiff.
In Maki v. Murray Hospital" the doctrine was invoked by a
patient in the defendant hospital, who, when out of his mind
with erysipelas, jumped out of a third story window; the court,
after calling it a prima facie case, said:
"In this state a presumption, which is 'a deduction
which the law expressly directs to be made from parti-
cular facts' (See. 10602 Rev. Codes 1921), is 'indirect
evidence,' (See. 10600 Id.), which can only be overcome
by other evidence, and the explanation given by defend-
ant must be satisfactory to overcome the prima facie case
made . . . . " (Italics the court's).
The court said the only time this is not true is where defendant
so satisfactorily explains the cause as to point to freedom from
negligence with such certainty as to preclude any other reason-
able hypothesis.
This latter quotation would seem definitely to put the case
under the minority view. Also assuming our court is speaking
of prima facie cases under its usual definition," we would follow
the minority view. It then seems very probable to this writer
that the evidence arising from the doctrine in Montana creates
a presumption or prima facie case which, if not rebutted, can
be the subject of a directed verdict.
Some of the other characteristics of this prima facie case
in this state should be noted. As usual the doctrine does not
cast upon the defendant the burden of disproving negligence in
the sense of making it incumbent upon him to establish freedom
"91 Mont. 251, 7 P. (2d) 228 (1932).
5A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence
in his favor is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called upon to
answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by
sufficient evidence, and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence
adduced on the other side. BLAcx's LAW DICTIONARY (Third Edition,
1933) p. 1414.
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 13 [1952], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol13/iss1/6
NOTES AND COMMENT
from negligence by a preponderance of the evidence." All he
has to do is present enough evidence to satisfy the jury that he
was not negligent." The jury is to weigh the defendant's re-
buttal against the plaintiff's presumption from res ipsa
loquitur.'
Another procedural problem in res ipsa loquitur which is
very important to the plaintiff's attorney is the matter of plead-
ings. Usually res ipsa loquitur is pleaded by a general allegation
of negligence, on the theory that "the thing speaks for itself."
Sometimes, however, specific pleadings are sought to be used. In
this case there are four views that have been taken: (1) that
the plaintiff by his specific allegations has waived or lost his
right to rely on the doctrine; (2) that he may take advantage
of it if the inference of negligence to be drawn supports the
specific allegation; (3) that it may be applied only if the specific
pleading is accompanied by a general allegation of negligence;
(4) that it is available without regard to the pleading."
Montana is said to adopt the first view above. Prosser in
his treatise on the subject cites Montana as falling within the
first group,' on the strength of Lyon v. Chicago M. and St. P.
By. Co. of Montana,' where the court says:
"If the plaintiff is in position to allege the specific
negligent acts which caused the injury, and can produce
evidence in support of the charge sufficient to make out
a prima facie case, the doctrine res ipsa loquitur cannot
be invoked; for to apply it under such circumstances
would permit the jury to give double weight to the evi-
dence, first to the facts themselves; and also to the in-
ference or presumption which the law deduces from the
existence of those facts, or some of them."
It is clear from this, that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case on his specific allegations he has no right to invoke the doc-
trine in Montana; however, this is only reasonable and does not
decide the main question as the plaintiff here has no real need
of the doctrine in that case. If there is doubt whether he has
proved the specific allegations, he may want to fall back on res
ipsa, and what would happen if plaintiff pleaded specific allega-
"Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 7 P. (2d) 228 (1932) ; Reyn-
olds v. Jones, 53 Mont. 251, 163 P. 469 (1917) ; Vonault v. O'Rourke, 97
Mont. 92, 33 P. (2d) 535 (1934).
"'John v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 42 Mont. 18, 111 P. 632, 32 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 85 (1910).
"Vonault v. O'Rourke, 97 Mont. 92, 33 P. (2d) 535 (1934).
"PRossER, LAW OF TORTS, § 44, p. 307 (1941).
r"PRossEa, LAW OF ToaRs, § 44, p. 307, ftnt. 56 (1941).50 Mont. 532, 148 P. 386 (1915).
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tions of negligence and also used a general allegation, and then
could not make out a prima facie case under the specific allega-
tions ? Could he then invoke the res ipsa doctrine on the general
allegations? This would seem to be the heart of the question,
and it appears that it is undecided in this jurisdiction. In a
doubtful case, the plaintiff cannot, when he draws the com-
plaint, forecast with assurance that the court will find his
case to be one within the doctrine. If he relies on the doctrine
and alleges generally, the court may find the case not to be res
ipsa with the result that he goes out on demurrer. If he alleges
specifically, he may not be able to fall back on the doctrine even
though the court finds it to be a res ipsa case. It would seem,
therefore, that if the court finds the case to be within the doc-
trine, the pleader should be enabled to fall back on res ipsa even
though he has alleged specifically, and especially if he has cou-
pled the specific with a general allegation.'
ROBERT APPELGREN
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON A NON-RESIDENT
VENDOR OF MONTANA LAND
The equity maxim, "aequitas agit in personam," though
shorn of its once pervasive vitality which was fostered by .Ln
attempt to promote rapport with the common law courts,' is still
a living, moving force in the United States in the absence of
statutory modification. However, even from very early times
52Under date of March 15, 1952, the case of Whitney v. Northland Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 7 State Reporter 101 ....... P. (2d) ...... was decided by
the Montana Supreme Court. In this case, the plaintiff, a bus passenger,
sued to recover damage for personal injury due to the overturning of
the bus. Verdict and judgment for the defendant below was reversed.
One notes with satisfacton the majority opinion citing and relying on
cases to the effect that where res ipsa is otherwise applicable, the plain-
tiff does not lose the benefit of the doctrine by alleging specific acts of
negligence which his evidence fails to prove or only tends to prove. It
is not, however, believed that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
in a res ipsa case. The dissenting opinion properly points out that the
burden is on the plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence to establish
his case, and if, at the close of the evidence the minds of jurors are in
equipoise, the plaintiff has failed; further, that the doctrine where
applicable furnishes merely a permissible evidential inference which is
not controlling on the jury, and that where the plaintiff elects to try his
case on "evidence of a higher grade and degree" than that of permissi-
ble inferences without request for an instruction on res ipsa, there can
be no reviewable error on which to postulate a reversal.
'1 Pommoy's EQurTY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 134, 135, pp. 183-186 (5th ed.
1941).
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